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PREJUDICIAL ERROR - THE MEASUREMENT OF
REVERSAL BY BOARDS OF REVIEW AND THE
U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS
MAJ. GnN. ALBERT M. ]KiUHFELD
I N discussing the standards by which errors of law are ex-
amined to determine whether or not reversal is warranted,
the role of Boards of Review and the Court of Military Ap-
peals must be considered at the outset. Boards of Review
strive to follow the precedents announced by the Court of
Military Appeals in much the same way as the United States
Courts of Appeal follow the precedents set by the United
States Supreme Court. Therefore, any comments concerning
the measurement for reversal arising from errors of law are
applicable to both levels of these appellate tribunals.1
Any discussion of the yardstick for reversal of courts-
martial findings or sentences because of errors of law must
begin with the congressional mandate on the subject found in
the Uniform Code of Military Justice: "A finding or sentence
of a court-martial shall not be held incorrect on the ground
of an error of law unless the error materially prejudices the
substantial rights of the accused." 2 Thus, Congress provided
a "harmless error" rule for use by the Armed Forces in the
administration of military justice. This is essentially the
same as Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.3
f Judge Advocate General, U.S. Air Force.
I This presentation is not intended to be a comprehensive coverage of the
sphere of operation of prejudicial error as opposed to harmless error, nor does
it cover the myriad situations where these principles have been applied.2 UNiFoRLI CoDE oF MiLTARY JusTicn art. 59(a), 10 U.S.C. §859(a)
(1958).
3 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTTAL, UNITD STATES, 1951, para. 87(c), en-
grafted the following limitations on the "harmless error" rule sanctioned by
the Congress: "The test to be applied in determining whether an error ma-
terially prejudiced the substantial rights of the accused is this: An error
prejudicial to the rights of the accused must be held to require the disapproval
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The Court of Military Appeals, itself a creature of the
Congress, has stated that it is "required to interpret the
Code and to enforce the provisions according to the intent of
Congress." 
The Congressional intent behind Article 59 (a), reflected
in the House Report on the Uniform Code of Military Justice,5
was that a finding of guilty should not be set aside for
technical reasons or for minor errors of law which did not
prejudice the rights of the accused.
The Court of Military Appeals first applied Article 59 (a)
in November of 1951, when it held that " 'substantial rights'
means not seeming or imaginary, not illusive, but real, solid
and firm rights." I The Court then followed the United
States Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. United States I by
considering harmless those errors which did not influence
or had but slight effect at the trial level. This adoption,
though, had the effect of superimposing two further limitations
on the "harmless error" rule, i.e., the error would not be con-
sidered harmless if it consisted of failure to conform to "a
constitutional norm or a specific command of Congress.. ,, 8
Shortly thereafter, the court suggested another possible limita-
tion on the "harmless error" rule by announcing the doctrine
of "military due process." 9
of a finding of guilty of an offense, or the part thereof, to which it relates
unless the competent evidence of record is of such quantity and quality that a
court of reasonable and conscientious men would have made the same finding
had the error not been committed.
"Regardless, however, of the test in the subparagraph above, if the error is
such a flagrant violation of a fundamental right of the accused as to amount
to a denial of due process . . . the finding must be disapproved regardless
of the compelling nature of the competent evidence of record."
[Jan.-Dec. 1957] COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE AD-
voCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DFP'T OF THE TREASURY, ANN. REP. 33.
r Hearings on H.R. 2498 Before House Committee on Armed Services,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1174-75 (1949).
6United States v. Lucas, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 19, 23, 1 C.M.R. 19, 23 (1951).
7328 U.S. 750 (1946).
8 Id. at 764-65.
1 United States v. Clay, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 74, 78, 1 C.M.R. 74, 78 (1951).
"Under our powers as an appellate court we can reverse for errors of law
which materially prejudice the substantial rights of the accused, and we need
go no further than to hold that the failure to afford to an accused any of
the enumerated rights denied him military due process and furnishes grounds
for us to set aside the conviction."
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A harbinger of discord on the court became apparent
when the late Judge Brosman, after recognizing the clear
mandate of Congress and the limitations adopted in the
Kotteakos case, announced a further limitation by way of
dicta.10 This limitation was later to become known as "gen-
eral prejudice." It required reversal without regard to the
effect an error might have on the accused's rights whenever
there was "an overt departure from some 'creative and in-
dwelling principle'--some critical and basic norm operative
in the area under consideration." 11 This doctrine was
introduced into military jurisprudence in a case where the
president of a general court-martial usurped the statutory
functions and duties of the law officer. The evidence was com-
pelling, and it was manifest that the conduct of the president
did not influence the members of the court. Judge Brosman,
with the Chief Judge concurring, stated that this was the
proper backdrop for the application of "general prejudice"
and the case was reversed, although no specific prejudice to
the rights of the accused was found.12  Judge Latimer, al-
though concurring in the result, expressed dissatisfaction
with the concept of "general prejudice" and stated that it was
"contrary to the clear mandate of Congress." 13 He then
searched the record and found specific prejudice to the ac-
cused 14 evidently a denial of "military due process" as en-
visioned in the Clay case. In this connection, it is interesting
"OUnited States v. Lee, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 212, 216, 2 C.M.R. 118, 122 (1952).
"Whether this error should be deemed-to constitute reversible error,--that is,
whether there is a fair risk that it materially prejudiced the substantial rights
of the accused-is, however, another matter." In regard to Article 59(a),
Judge Brosman stated: "It seems to us that the mandate of this statutory
directive is clear. We are not to reverse for error of law unless we are of
opinion on the basis of the proceedings in their entirety that the substantial
rights of the accused have been prejudicially affected." Ibid.
11 Ibid.
'12 United States v. Berry, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 2 C.M.R. 141 (1952).
13Id. at 242, 2 C.M.R. at 148. "The Court's opinion goes much
further and rationalizes on general prejudice, which appears to me unnecessary
in this setting, and contrary to the clear mandate of Congress. It is to re-
serve from my concurrence an approval of that concept which leads me to file
this opinion." Ibid.
14 "The accused was denied one of the principal safeguards erected to pro-
tect him, and . . . this denial was prejudicial to him." Id. at 244, 2 C.M.R.
at 150.
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to note that "military due process" was conceived in dicta,
as was "general prejudice," and is now firmly entrenched
in military jurisprudence, although its precise meaning and
application have never been pinned down.
Later, these two diametrically opposed concepts were
thoroughly explored. Judge Latimer, concurring in an opin-
ion by the Chief Judge, completely divorced himself from
the concept of "general prejudice" and referred to the pre-
vious decisions utilizing the doctrine as "decisions which I be-
lieve are calculated, however unwittingly, to confuse and
muddle the administration of military justice. Not only are
those decisions fraught with the likelihood of undesirable con-
sequences, they ignore the plain wording of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 50 USC §§ 551-736, and the ex-
perience gained by the Federal civilian courts over their full
period of existence." 15 Judge Brosman, also concurring, said
in regard to Judge Latimer's opinion, "I submit that on the
basis of the record, it is sadly clear that my brother is
waging what is essentially a war of tags and labels-a really
pointless debate in the sphere of semantics." 16
"General prejudice" has been relied upon to reverse a
conviction even though it could be determined on other grounds
that the accused was denied a fair trial. 7 But in a later
case, Judge Brosman, the progenitor of the principle, de-
termined that it was not necessary to "inquire into the de-
sirability of a reliance on the notion of general prejudice
where there is a 'finding of a probability of specific prejudice
against the accused.' "1 18 Also, it has been held that "gen-
eral prejudice" precludes application of the "compelling evi-
dence" rule. 19
In July 1952, the court created an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of prejudice and invoked the rule of "general preju-
15United States v. Woods, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 203, 215, 8 C.M.R. 3, 15
(1953).
16 Id. at 209, 8 C.M.R. at 9.
17 United States v. Green, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 610, 18 C.M.R. 234 (1955).
18 United States v. McClusky, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 545, 553, 20 C.M.R. 261, 269
(1955).
19 United States v. Taylor, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 178, 17 C.M.R. 178 (1954).
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dice" because the law officer had entered a closed session of
the court-martial while it was deliberating on the sentence.
20
This irrebuttable presumption was applied even though the
subject matter of the conference was beneficial to the ac-
cused.21 Approximately two and one-half years later, the
court determined that such an intrusion by the law officer
no longer required the invocation of "general prejudice,"
and that in future cases, a standard of "specific prejudice"
would be applied. The court, in addition, pointed out that in
applying such a standard, a rebuttable presumption of preju-
dice would result from such an intrusion. Thus, the burden
was thrust upon the government to show that the accused
was not "specifically prejudiced." 22 In April of 1958, Judge
Ferguson, writing for the majority of the court, recognized
the rebuttable presumption theory but stated, "prejudicial er-
ror occurs when the law officer appears in closed session and
refers the court-martial to outside legal sources affecting the
sentence without affording the accused and his counsel the op-
portunity to object or request clarification of such matters." 23
Judge Latimer dissented and observed: "In cases involving
unlawful communications with court members, I have watched
the doctrine of reversal without prejudice ebb and flow but
I had concluded it was laid to rest . ,, 24 In his opinion,
the proper standard would be "specific prejudice," and he
concluded that the advice given by the law officer and the
legal sources to which he referred the court-martial were
correct and not misleading.
Throughout history, members of both general and special
courts-martial had made liberal use of the Manual for Courts-
Martial during open and closed sessions. In the first case
in which the Court of Military Appeals commented on such
practice, Judge Quinn, with Judge Ferguson concurring,
stated that the Manual "has no place in the closed session
2 0 United States v. Keith, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 493, 4 C.M.R. 85 (1952).
21 United States v. Smith, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 531, 4 C.M.R. 123 (1952).
22United States v. Allbee, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 448, 18 C.M.R. 72 (1955).
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deliberations of the court-martial." 25 In United States v.
Rinehart 26 the majority of the court prohibited the possession
of the Manual during the course of a trial (except for the
president of a special court-martial) or while deliberating on
the findings and sentence, such prohibition to be effective
thirty days after 27 November 1957, the date of the mandate.
Judge Latimer, in a later case, referred to this decision as
the case "which turned military procedure topsy-turvy .... ,, 27
During the thirty-day grace period, those cases wherein the
Manual was used by members other than the president of a
special court-martial were tested by the standard of "a fair
risk of harm to the accused" or "specific prejudice." 28 After
the grace period, the first case that involved the use of the
Manual to be considered by the Court of Military Appeals
was reversed, even though the president of the court-martial
filed an affidavit to the effect that he did not refer to anything
except the procedure guide.29
The law on the matter today is that it is "per se reversible
error" for a court member to have access to the Manual in
violation of the Rinehart directive.
The Court of Military Appeals has held consistently that
any circumstances which give the appearance of improperly
influencing the court-martial proceedings against the accused
constitute error of the sort which must be condemned. 30 Such
influence was detected in the pretrial proceedings of a case
when the investigating officer's recommendation for trial by
special court-martial was erroneously stated in the advice of
the staff judge advocate to the convening authority.31 Because
of this, the Court of Military Appeals set aside the con-
viction. The Court of Military Appeals quite properly reached
the same result in another case because of "pernicious sug-
gestions" made by the convening authority to members of an
25 United States v. Boswell, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 148, 23 C.M.R. 369, 372
(1957).
268 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.ILR. 212 (1957).
27 United States v. Turner, supra note 23, at 131, 25 C.M.R. at 393.
28United States v. Vara, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 651, 25 C.M.R. 155 (1958).
29 United States v. Dobbs, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 328, 29 C.M.R. 144 (1960).30 United States v. Hawthorne, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 293, 22 C.M.R. 83 (1956).
92 United States v. Greenwalt, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 569, 20 C.M.R. 285 (1955).
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appointed court during the course of a pretrial conference
with them,3 2 and in still another case because command in-
fluence was present when the convening authority interfered
with a law officer's ruling in granting a defense request for
a continuance.33  This concept has been applied to post-trial
activities-reversal of an affirmance by a Board of Review
was directed and a new staff judge advocate's review was
ordered when it appeared that the original review of the
staff judge advocate had been prepared by an assistant staff
judge advocate who had previously acted as the law officer in
the trial of a co-accused, 34 even though the review was con-
curred in by the staff judge advocate.
When inadmissible evidence is admitted during the course
of a trial, the measurement for reversal used by the Court
of Military Appeals is, as a practical matter, the "fair risk"
rule. Under this rule, cases will not be reversed "unless
the improperly admitted evidence presents a fair risk of
prejudice to the accused." 35 Though only one of the three
judges on the ,Court of Military Appeals subscribes to this
standard, his views are controlling, because he occupies a
central position between the views of the other two judges.
They occupy the end positions in the arena: one has espoused
the view that a reasonable possibility of prejudice should suf-
fice for reversal, 36 while the other would require a reasonable
probability.37
CONCLUSION
It should now be readily apparent that prejudicial error
defies analysis on a completely mechanical basis. Error is
relatively easy to recognize and, as a result, there is little
divergence in opinion on that subject. However, whether or
32United States v. Littrice, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 487, 13 C.M.R. 43 (1953).
33United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 16 C.M.R. 161 (1954).5
-
4United States v. Turner, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 38, 21 C.M.R. 164 (1956).
35 United States v. Johnson, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 384, 386, 29 C.M.R. 200, 202(1960).36 United States v. Kelley, 7 U.S.C.M.A. 584, 589, 23 C.M.R. 48, 53 (1957).3 United States v. Nix, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 691, 694, 29 C.M.R. 507, 510(1960).
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not an error is prejudicial has become a subject of much con-
troversy. The label applied to error has, to a disturbing
extent, varied with the person who selected it. It seems
apparent that prejudice, like perfection, is an absolute and
is not subject to degrees. Either an error is prejudicial or it
is not, and the adjective used in front of prejudice is not
helpful or decisive. Congress was not as esoteric as the Court
of Military Appeals. The prose employed in the Uniform
Code is quite specific, and, in a given case, its provisions
either are or are not violated; and, when violated, the re-
sulting error is or is not prejudicial to the accused.
In spite of the Congressional mandate intended to prevent
reversals where justice has been done, there has been a
tendency by the Court of Military Appeals to reverse when
the error might properly be considered harmless. The cases
are legion in which the court has applied the label of "preju-
dice" when the conclusion is inescapable from the record of
trial that the error could not have affected the substantial
rights of the accused. The court shows no reluctance, when
an error creeps into the record, to label it prejudicial and
place the burden upon the government to demonstrate that the
substantial rights of the accused were not prejudiced. This
apparently is a throwback to the early years of this century
before the adoption of a "harmless error" rule in 1919.38
Much of this article has been devoted to a consistent and
systematic analysis of the decisions of the Court of Military
Appeals. The decisions of the court are promulgated on
Friday afternoons. On Monday mornings, somewhat like
the "Monday morning quarterbacks," key staff officers together
with the Judge Advocate General have a full discussion of
the cases that were published the preceding Friday. As a
result of these discussions, it has sometimes become necessary
to issue special instructions to installations on a world-wide
basis. This thorough analysis of the decisions on a weekly
basis is conducted primarily to ensure that the chairmen of
the Boards of Review and other key officers charged with
38 Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, § 269, 40 Stat. 1181.
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the administration of military justice are fully aware of the
trends as they are developed. In this manner, the Air Force
is able to react promptly to the mandates of the court as
they are issued.
In suimnation, it seems that the Court of Military Ap-
peals has made a most liberal interpretation of what will be
categorized as "prejudicial error" (however that term is de-
fined by the individual judge), and has been rather loath
to apply or even to mention or refer to the harmless error
rule envisaged by the Congress.
Judge Advocates in the Armed Forces are dedicated to
the goal of a just result in every case processed under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Comparatively speaking,
they realize that our present system is still in its embryonic
stage and that the Court of Military Appeals, during this
short time, has been called upon to set the initial guidelines
for a great number of controversial matters. The court will,
in the future, have more time and better opportunity to ex-
amine the impact of the doctrines thus far pronounced and
to clarify and modify them as may be appropriate. During
this period of evolution, we can hope that the court will
give special attention to the harmless error rule to the end
that an error of law will not be grounds for reversal of a
conviction unless the rights of the accused have, in fact, been
substantially prejudiced.
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